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In transformational grammar there seem to be two major methods of 
semantic analysis of sentences: the analysis of the internal selectional restric- 
tions on one side, and the analysis of synonymy relationships between 
different sentences on the other (we shall call these two types internal and 
external semantic analysis, respectively). The internal analysis gives insight 
into the semantical and presuppositional structure of items that are part 
of the analyzed sentence: the external analysis shows sentence ambiguities 
and points out identities between semantic descriptions which mirror 
relationships of synonymy. 
In his book "Theorie des Kommentierens. Eine Grundlagenstudie zur 
Semantik und Pragmatik" (Theory of Commentary. A Basic Study in 
Semantics and Pragmatics), Roland Posner adds a third model to semantic 
analysis that provides a very important new method of operationalized 
semantic analysis. At first glance this model is similar to external analysis, 
because it analyzes the relation of "comment" (instead of synonymy) between 
different sentences; but it turns out that the study of comment relations 
(see below) gives insight into the internal semantic structure of sentences 
because providing the possibility of segmenting the sentence information 
into smaller parts, upon each of which it is possible to comment. Posner's 
model thus lies between the common methods of semantic analysis: it 
uses external relationships of sentences to describe internal semantic struc- 
tures. His model makes it possible to answer the important question: out 
of which primitive units of information does the complex information 
which is given by a sentence consist ? Moreover, his research gives insight 
into the relationship between semantic and pragmatic representations and 
the problem of integrating pragmatical descriptions into transformational 
grammar. 
In this review I shall be concurrently describing three major issues in 
Posner's book: (a) the issue of commentary, (b) the issue of semantic analysis 
and (c) the issue of pragmatics and its relationship to semantic description. 
Finally, I shall try to point out the importance of this operational pproach 
to semantic description of sentences. 
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1. We first explain the analysis procedure used by Posner, and indicate 
why this procedure contributes significantly to semantic descriptions. 
Posner's analysis is based on a special contextual relationship between 
sentences, a relationship he calls "comment." This relationship exists, e.g., 
between the sentences (1) and (2): 
(1) Bill hit Bob. 
(2) That is not true. 
The second sentence is understood as a comment on the first sentence, 
i.e., "it is not true, that Bill hit Bob": The speaker of sentence (2) claims 
that the event proposed by the speaker of sentence (1) is not true. Sentence (2) 
is called a comment on sentence (1). In this example the comment is a denial 
of the information given in the sentence commented upon; beside this 
there is a large variety of other possible comments, such as, is true, is nice, 
like very much, I hate to mention, etc. The relation of "comment" between 
sentences is a semantic relation: it exists between the information given 
by the first sentence (e.g., about the fact that Bill hit Bob) and a judgement 
about this information given by the following comment (e.g., that it is not 
true that Bill hit Bob). 
This relationship is established by repeating information of the first 
sentence in the comment (that Bill hit Bob), or by referring to this information 
by that. It is crucial to realize that not all the information of the first sentence, 
but only a part of it, is repeated and therefore commented on in the second 
sentence. This can be shown by commenting on different parts of the informa- 
tion given in sentence (1): 
(3) Bill hit Bob (and nobody else). 
(4) Bill hit Bob (and nobody else). I (2) That is not true. 
r t 
(5) Bill hit Bob (and didn t kiss him). J 
The sentences (1), (3), (4) and (5) give the same information, because they 
all state the truth of the same fact (namely that Bill hit Bob); these sentences 
are paraphrases of each other. But the comment in all four cases completely 
denies different parts of this information: It denies the event completely (1), 
it denies that it was Bill who acted (3), it denies that Bob experienced the 
action (4), or it denies that the action was hitting (5). These examples how 
that the comment selects a particular part out of the complex information 
that the sentence commented upon presents. This selection depends on 
the pragmatical structure of the sentence commented on, i.e., on the 
thematical focus of that sentence. Posner's basic idea is the following: if 
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you define a class of paraphrases by identity of the fact they refer to (i.e., 
by identity of information they give), and you comment on these paraphrases, 
you then have an operation to identify all the primitive units of information 
the complex information these sentences hare consists of. Because you 
can comment on each part of the complex information of a sentence by 
paraphrasing this sentence in different ways, the operation of comment 
allows the identification of all parts of information of that particular sentence. 
In short: commentary provides a method to describe the information given 
by a sentence. Commentary therefore is a basic operation in semantic 
analysis. 
In fact, two operations are combined in this analytic strategy: in a first 
step a class of possible paraphrases i  constituted (such a class is defined 
by identity of reference); in a second step all components of the complex 
information this paraphrastic lass of sentences gives are identified by 
commentary on each of these paraphrases. Putting all the information the 
comments refer to together leads to an explicit description of the complex 
information given by every sentence which belongs to the analyzed class 
of paraphrases. 
At this point, two critical questions may arise: 
a. This semantic analysis depends on constituting classes of paraphrases 
by identity of reference. What about sentences without truth values (e.g., 
questions) ? Have they no paraphrases and are they, therefore, outside the 
domain of this analysis ?
b. Frege (and many people following him) stress the importance of 
distinguishing between reference and meaning. How does this analysis 
reflect this difference ? Does it exclude the notion of meaning (Sinn in 
Frege's sense) from semantic analysis because it depends on classes of 
paraphrases defined by identity of reference ? 
c. What are, in general, the limits of that analysis ? Is it restricted to 
special types of sentences, does it exclude analysis of lexical items, does it 
take account of all semantic aspects of language, etc. ? 
Before discussing these questions we want to show Posner's semantic 
analysis in more detail. 
2. To illustrate Posner's analysis we briefly discuss one example; in 
doing so we focus only on empirical evidence and do not go further into 
the other problems of logical representation that Posner deals with. 
By the criterion of identical reference, the following class of paraphrases 
can be constituted: 
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(1) Bill hit Bob. 
I 
(3) Bill hit Bob. 
! 
(4) Bill hit Bob. 
! 
(5) Bill hit Bob. 
This class of sentences includes some of the paraphrases of sentence (1) 
which preserve the structure of lexical entries of that sentence (to avoid 
some difficulties in defining paraphrases, Posner limits his analysis to those 
kinds of paraphrases). The surfaces of the paraphrases given above differ 
in stress tructure: these differences are expressions of the different pragmatic 
structure these sentences have. (By different pragmatic structure is meant 
differences in thematical focus that occur between these sentences, i.e., 
differences in the division between more imp6rtant and less important 
information the speakers of these sentences want to express). 
These differences in thematical focus provide opportunities to comment 
on different parts of the information given by that class of paraphrases: 
the scope of the comment 
(2) That is not true. 
differs from paraphrase to paraphrase according to the differences of 
thematical focus. The strategy of commenting on all items of the class of 
paraphrases therefore is an operation to identify all the components of 
information the complex information given by the paraphrases (with a 
difference in thematical focus) consists of. The operation worked out with 
comment (2) results in the following list of parts of information: 
(1') [That] Bill hit Bob [is not true]. 
(3') [That] it was Bill [who hit Bob is not true]. 
(4') [That] it was Bob [whom Bill hit is not true]. 
(5') [That] it was hitting [that Bill did to Bob is not true]. 
So sentence (1), and of course all paraphrases of sentence (1), give the infor- 
mation that 
(a) X didQ to Y. 
(b) X who did Q to Y was Bill. 
(c) Y to whom X did Q was Bob. 
(d) What X did to Y was hitting. 
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i.e., sentence (1) and its paraphrases have the basic structure of (a) and 
assert statements (b), (c) and (d). In logical formulation: 
(1") (x = BILL &y = BOB &9 -- H IT& xyQ)QEyExE.  
Step by step, the operation of commentary leads to this specific and explicit 
description of the complex information given by sentence (1). If we would 
add paraphrases of sentence (1) that substitute, for example, the predicate 
hit by an analytic but synonymous expression, the analysis would result 
not only in semantic description of sentences but in semantic description 
of lexical items. And, of course, this operation is not confined to simple 
sentences like (1) but can be applied (as Posner shows in one chapter of 
his book) to rather complex sentences exactly in the same way. 
Nor does the analysis of non-declarative s ntences end up in funda- 
mentally unsolvable problems: if it is possible to formulate a criterion for 
non-declarative paraphrases (e.g., "sentences which imply identical classes 
of other sentences are paraphrases"), then it is no problem to carry out 
commentary with a comment that is applicable to non-declarative s ntences 
(e.g., I don't like that, this is strange, that is incredible, etc.) In fact, the type 
of comment differentiates between declarative and non-declarative s ntences 
(it is well known that Austin has described elocutions by giving comments, 
(namely, "that is true") that are not applicable to sentences like could you 
pass me the sugar ?). 
So, I think, it is reasonable to assume that the operation of commentary 
is applicable to all kinds of sentences and that it results not only in a descrip- 
tion of assertions given by sentences, but also assertions given by lexical 
items, and descriptions of elocutionary acts given by sentences of all types 
(declaratives and non-declarative@ 
3. The application of commentary sentences in order to identify ele- 
mentary informational units is not only a means of semantic analysis but 
also gives important insight into the relationship between semantics and 
pragmatics in theories of grammar. Let us return to the class of paraphrases 
we have constituted in Section 2. As paraphrases, all sentences in this class 
naturally get the same semantic description, namely (1"). The differences 
are on the level of pragmatics, i.e., on the level of speakers' judgements 
about importance or non-importance of information. While these differences 
have to be made explicit in pragmatic descriptions of these sentences, they 
do not--at this stage of analysis--seem to influence the semantic representa- 
tion of these sentences in a grammar. 
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This impression changes if more complex sentences such as (6), (7), and 
(8) are discussed: 
(6) It is not true, that Bill hit Bob. 
(7) It is not true, that it was Bill who hit Bob. 
(8) It is not true, that it was Bob whom Bill hit. 
Obviously, these sentences are not paraphrases of each other so that they 
have to get different semantic descriptions. The basic problem is that these 
semantic differences depend on the differences between the sentences (1), 
(3) and (4) which, as we just stated, get identical semantic descriptions. 
One solution would be to abandon the principle of constructivity (i.e., 
that descriptions of complex phenomena are to be built out of more ele- 
mental3; descriptions of the primitive units this complex phenomenon 
consists of); this is not really a solution since that would spoil the possibility 
of semantic theory at all (without he principle of constructivity coherent 
theories of complex phenomena obviously are not possible). The alternative 
solution is to integrate semantic and pragmatic descriptions of the sentences 
(1), (3) and (4) so that the semantic differences between the sentences (6), 
(7) and (8) can be accounted for on the basis of a semantic-pragmatic 
representation f sentences (1), (3) and (4). In other words: to solve the 
problem of describing the semantic structure of complex sentences which 
include comments [like (6), (7), and (8)], the description of simple sentences 
[like (1), (3), (4)] must be able to predict the behavior of these sentences 
in commentary contexts; from that it follows that this description must 
include an integrated semantic-pragmatic representation. This semantic- 
pragmatic representation has to differentiate between the sentences (I), (3) 
and (4), and it must predict he part of information it is possible to comment 
on (i.e., it must make explicit he thematical focus of that sentence). A rather 
rough version (that, as Posner points out, is neither generalizable nor 
empirically motivated) of that integrated representation might have the 
following form (where [ ] marks the thematieal focus): 
(1") (x = BILL & y ----- BOB & [Q = HIT & xyQ) QE] yE xE, 
(3") ([x = BILL] &y = BOB &Q = HIT & xyQ)OEyExE,  
(4") (x ---- BILL & [y ---- BOB] &Q = HIT & xyQ)QEyExE.  
With this representation the principle of constructivity can be satisfied: 
the pragmatic differences [expressed by (1)] can account for differences 
between the complex sentences (6), (7) and (8) which include sentences 
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(1), (3) and (4). Nevertheless the representation gives identical semantic 
description of the paraphrases (1), (3) and (4). 
Posner's discussion of the relation between simple sentences (1), (3), (4) 
and complex sentences (6), (7), (8) (in respect of their semantic and pragmatic 
description) provides a very strong argument in favor of the integration 
of the semantic and the pragmatic representation f a sentence. It is not 
generally satisfactory to handle pragmatic ategories as semantic ategories 
(as Ross has proposed in his analysis of performatives) because that does 
not allow one to give an identical semantic description to paraphrases like 
(1), (3) and (4). On the other hand, it is also not sufficient o quote an 
independent pragmatic representation from time to time in the semantic 
representation (if there are deictic expressions, for example, or performative 
verbs), as Wunderlich has proposed in several papers, because such a 
formulation does not match the special relationship between complex 
sentences like (6) and simple sentences like (1). Posner gives a great deal 
of evidence for integration of the semantic and the pragmatic omponent 
of the grammar (whatever the final formulation of that integrated repre- 
sentation may be), and this evidence, I think, is hard to deny. 
4. It may be possible to argue that Posner's model of semantic and 
pragmatic analysis is rather trivial and not at all based on new ideas. It is 
well known that the scope of quantifiers (such as for ALL or NEG) 
segments the logical structure of a sentence, that a comment like true can 
be used in semantic analysis of declarative statements (logicians have done 
that for a long time), that the notion of paraphrase (i.e., the relation of 
synonomy) is basic for semantic description, that the underlying logical 
structure of sentences like (1) can be described like (1"), etc. I do not share 
this point of view, because I believe that Posner's proposal is remarkable 
and important in two respects: 
a. It provides a generalization of well-known but isolated heuristic 
approaches in developing the linguistic concept of commentary, describing 
its semantic and pragmatic structure. This general operation is likely to be 
applicable to all problems of semantic analysis. Moreover, it gives evidence 
that it can solve problems of pragmatic description as a component of 
grammar. 
b. It provides an operationalized strategy of semantic and pragmatic 
analysis that results in an explicit description of the semantic-pragmatic 
representation f a sentence in a grammar. 
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In both respects Posner's proposal fills a big gap in contemporary semantic 
and pragmatic research. 
The major problematic ssue (and that refers back to the critical questions 
in 1) is still the notion of "paraphrase," its definition, its generality, and 
its empirical validity. Posner has limited his analysis to declarative sentences 
and to paraphrases which preserve lexical entries because that is the field 
of maximum empirical validity. Classes of paraphrases can be defined by 
identity of reference. Obviously this definition is not generally applicable 
and an appropriate definition of paraphrase (that accounts for the fact that 
many sentences and parts of sentences do not refer to parts of our empirical 
world or to parts of all possible worlds) still has to be formulated. Because 
referential semantics cannot serve as a general model it is essential to define 
classes of paraphrases more in terms of sentence relationships (the relation 
of implication seems to be crucial) rather than in terms of relations to the 
"world." 
In spite of this problem Posner's study contributes very much not only 
to semantic and pragmatic analysis of sentences but also to an explicit 
description of one difference between reference and meaning (a crucial 
issue of semantic research). His analysis shows that differences between 
sentences with identical reference (and therefore with an identical semantic 
representation) can be described as differences in pragmatic representation, 
and that pragmatic differences become semantic ones in special contexts. 
A description of the meaning of a sentence seems to be very much like 
the integrated semantic-pragmatic representation given in (1"). Making 
explicit a heuristic approach to semantic and pragmatic analysis of sentences, 
as well as semantic and pragmatic representations and their relationship to 
each other, is an important gain of Posner's tudy. 
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